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Environmental incentives for and usefulness of textual risk reporting: Evidence from 
Germany 
 
Abstract: 
Drawing on distinct German institutional characteristics related to cultural, legal, financial, and 
regulatory features, this paper investigates the extent to which environmental incentives influence 
German non-financial firms in revealing risk information in their annual report narratives. The paper 
also examines whether risk-related disclosure (aggregate risk reporting and the tone of news about 
risk) is useful by investigating its impact on market liquidity and investor-perceived risk. We find that 
the decision to provide or withhold such risk information is less likely to be significantly associated 
with environmental incentives. Among those incentives, we find that German firms are significantly 
influenced by their underlying risks rather than other factors including ownership structure, capital 
structure, external equity finance, and borrowing. The decision to disclose is likely to be influenced by 
the size of the firm and whether or not it produces lengthy annual reports. The results also suggest 
that the impact of aggregate risk reporting levels was not observable until a distinction was made 
between bad and good news about risk. Specifically, we find that the German market tends to 
positively (negatively) price good (bad) news about risk by either improving (worsening) market 
liquidity through removing (creating) information asymmetries, or reducing (increasing) investor-
perceived risk.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Aggregate risk reporting; good and bad news about risk (tone); investor-perceived risk; 
market liquidity; textual analysis. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Traditionally, the literature on corporate disclosure indicates that the level of disclosure in debt-
oriented countries (e.g., Germany) is lower than that in equity-oriented countries (e.g., the U.S. and 
U.K.), since firms from the former countries have disincentives to reveal information in their annual 
report narratives (Evans, Eierle, & Haller, 2002). The findings of work by Hofstede (1991, 2001), and 
subsequently Gray (1988), concur with this. Countries that are characterized by high levels of 
uncertainty avoidance and low levels of individualism, such as Germany, are expected to have low 
levels of disclosure (Doupnik & Tsakumis, 2004). In contrast to that argument, current practice shows 
that German firms tend to provide high levels of risk reporting. For example, KPMG (2013: 27) states 
that “... for many years, German companies have had to report on risks, but it often doesn’t provide 
much help in deciding whether to buy a company’s stock.” Furthermore, Elshandidy, Fraser, & 
Hussainey (2015) find that German firms tend to provide higher levels of risk information than U.K. 
firms.  
 
This phenomenon gives rise to two questions. The first concerns whether and to what extent risk 
information is principally associated with distinctly German features. The importance of this question stems 
from the current work on international convergence, to which efforts underlying institutional 
differences can still act as major obstacles. Given the number of countries adopting the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), much work is needed to explore the extent to which 
international differences will survive in this new era (Nobes, 2006). The German accounting system 
possesses a unique set of features, particularly as Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB, or the Commercial Code) 
accounting still dominates (see Fülbier & Klein, 2013). First, the German accounting system follows 
the continental European accounting model, in which there is a great reliance on legal form (the form-
over-substance approach) (Nobes & Parker, 2016). Second, German Accounting Standard (GAS) No. 
5 requires German firms to reveal information about their risks that is reliable and relevant for decision 
making. This, in addition to the IFRS requirements, makes German accounting unique in terms of 
having a formal and comprehensive standard on risk reporting (Dobler, 2005). 
 
The second question concerns whether and to what extent the observed risk information is useful. 
Answering this question contributes to the ongoing debate around whether narrative sections of 
annual reports convey useful information to investors. The debate has been addressed within U.S. 
research (e.g., Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014) and U.K. research 
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(e.g., Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015). However, little is known empirically about 
whether German firms are likely to reveal useful risk information to their investors.  
 
This paper adds to the current body of literature concerning the main incentives for risk 
reporting, since the incentives behind the provision of this information have not been fully explored. 
In fact, little research, if any, has been conducted thus far on the extent to which German 
environmental factors might lead firms to disclose risk information in their annual report narratives. 
One could argue that the mandated approach to risk reporting in Germany (even post IFRS) limits 
the exploration of potential incentives for risk reporting. However, such reasoning seems to be 
inconsistent with Dobler’s (2008) conclusion regarding the necessity of exploring risk reporting 
incentives, even in highly regulated countries. To date there appears to be a gap in the literature 
regarding the extent to which environmental incentives lead to high levels of risk disclosure. This 
paper contributes to that literature by exploring how environmental factors influence German firms’ 
disclosure of risk information. Prior research (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; Elshandidy et al., 2015) 
on risk reporting in Germany does not examine the extent to which German environmental factors 
affect firms’ decisions on whether to disclose risk information (and if so, how), nor does it comment 
on the usefulness of such information. We rely on the software package QSR version 6 to measure 
risk reporting by counting the number of statements that indicate risk reporting in the narrative 
sections of annual reports.1 In this paper, the term environmental incentives is used to refer to the unique 
environmental factors derived from German institutional characteristics that shape accounting 
practices (measurement and disclosure). The environmental incentives include variables that indicate risk, 
ownership structure, capital structure, external equity finance, and borrowing. 
 
The paper furthers current research on the usefulness of risk reporting by examining not only 
the aggregate levels (e.g., Kravet & Muslu, 2013) of risk disclosure but also the impact of the risk 
reporting tone (good, bad, or net tone). To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence 
examining whether or not risk information (aggregate risk reporting and either its tone or net tone) 
has a significant impact on the German market. Moreover, this paper's evidence is distinct from that 
provided within the U.S. context. Early U.S. studies such as Rajgopal (1999) and Hodder & McAnally 
                                                          
1 QSR version 6 is an earlier version of  NVivo that better suits the data we need to analyze in the sense that it 
provides the option of  using the statement as a coding unit rather than the word, thereby avoiding the problem of  double-
counting, as well as advancing the context of  textual analyses. More details are provided in Section 4.2. 
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(2001) investigate the impact on the market of market risk disclosure as required by Financial 
Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48. In observing the market reaction to risk information, those studies 
rely on an indirect measure for risk reporting since they posit that the market reaction around the 
provision of the 10-K report, prior to and after the release of FRR 48, indicates its usefulness. 
Consistent with recent U.S. research (Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014), our paper uses 
textual analysis, a direct measure, to capture not only the aggregate risk reporting but also its tone 
(whether risk information conveys good or bad news) in respect of market liquidity and investor-
perceived risk in a quite different and unique context (Germany). Our paper also answers Kravet & 
Muslu’s (2013) call for further research on textual risk reporting to examine whether and how risk-
related disclosure with a negative emphasis, or bad news, has a different impact on users’ perceptions. 
To investigate risk information usefulness, our paper utilizes bid-ask spreads and the volatility of stock 
returns as measures for market liquidity and investor-perceived risk, respectively.  
 
Our findings suggest that, on average, almost 18% of  the German firms’ narrative disclosure 
investigated was associated with risk. We find that the risk disclosure decision is less likely to be 
significantly associated with environmental incentives. Amongst those incentives, we find that German 
firms are significantly more influenced by their underlying risks rather than other factors (i.e., 
ownership structure, capital structure, external equity finance, and borrowing). Additionally, we find 
that the disclosure of  risk information is moderately influenced by factors such as the dividend payout. 
However, we find that the key drivers of  the provision of  risk information, economically and 
statistically, are a firm’s size and the length of  its annual report. These results have both theoretical 
and practical implications as they contribute to the ongoing debate around the extent to which distinct 
traditional characteristics of  the German context continue to influence accounting practices 
(Dittmann, Maug, & Schneider, 2010), even after the international convergence that has occurred 
following Germany’s mandatory adoption of  IFRS.  
 
The results also suggest that the impact of  aggregate risk reporting levels is not observable until 
a distinction is made between bad and good news about risk. Our results suggest that, on average, 
German firms tend to be marginally less (more) optimistic (pessimistic) when conveying information 
related to their risks. We find that the German market tends to positively (negatively) price good (bad) 
news about risk by either improving (worsening) market liquidity through removing (creating) 
information asymmetries, or reducing (increasing) investor-perceived risk. These results emphasize 
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the importance of  distinguishing between good and bad risk-related news in aggregate risk reporting, 
particularly when investigating the usefulness of  either general disclosure (as recommended by 
Kothari, Li, & Short, 2009) or risk disclosure (see Kravet & Muslu’s 2013 call).  
 
The remainder of  this paper proceeds as follows. The distinct factors of  the German context 
are discussed in the following section. Section 3 develops the hypotheses related to the main 
determinants and to the usefulness of  risk-related disclosure. Sample selection, data collection, the 
steps of  the automated textual analysis, and the empirical model are then introduced in Section 4. 
Section 5 discusses the results, further analyses, and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes, providing 
academic and practical implications and suggesting avenues for future research.   
 
2. Institutional background of German context  
This section discusses the distinct characteristics within the German context that can be captured 
through its cultural, legal, financial, and regulatory aspects.  
 
With regard to cultural aspects, it has been argued that national culture is an important element 
in explaining differences in accounting practices, including measurement and/or disclosure (Nobes, 
1998). One of the most widely used frameworks for culture is that provided and developed over the 
years by Hofstede.2 Based on Hofstede’s scores, individualism and uncertainty avoidance seem to be 
considerably different in Germany than in the U.S. and U.K. This reflects the fact that the German 
national culture places a premium on safety, predictability, hierarchy, and high conservatism, when 
compared to American and British cultures (Haskins, Ferris, & Selling, 1996). The relatively low scores 
for power distance in Germany suggest that its firms will have a higher preference than U.S. firms for 
authority over individuality. The relatively higher scores for long-term orientation in the German culture 
compared to the British and American cultures indicate Germany’s preference for thrift and high 
levels of saving (Haskins et al., 1996) and reflect a more conservative view of accounting. 
                                                          
2 Hofstede’s (1991, 2001) cultural dimensions can be interpreted as follows: Power distance deals with the fact that 
individuals in societies are inevitably unequal. It expresses the attitude of  the culture towards these inequalities amongst 
people. Individualism concerns the degree of  interdependence a society maintains among its members. Uncertainty avoidance 
relates to the way a society deals with the fact that the future is uncertain. Long-term orientation concerns the extent to which 
a society shows a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional historical short-term point of  view.  
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Gray (1988) argues that the content of accounting information is also closely linked to cultural 
values. Doupnik & Perera (2011) find that positive linkages between strong uncertainty avoidance and 
secrecy follow from a need to restrict disclosure so as to avoid conflict and competition and preserve 
security. Further, having a preference for collectivism directs accounting practices towards secrecy, 
with the primary aim of avoiding any conflicts of interests between insiders rather than outsiders. 
Fülbier & Klein (2015) argue that accounting conservatism can be justified by uncertainty avoidance, 
which is traditionally more pronounced in Germany than in the U.S. and the U.K. (Gray, 1988). They 
further argue that this approach may also add to Germany’s preference for well-organized systems 
with legally binding accounting rules and institutionalized procedures to cope better with risk and 
uncertainty over future events.  
 
With regard to legal aspects, prior research distinguishes between two legal systems. The first is 
the common law system in which accounting practices focus on the usefulness of accounting 
information and the protection of investors (Nobes, 1998). The second, the code law system, subjects 
firms to specific rules and procedures that are explicit and detailed in relation to measurement and/or 
disclosure practices, with an emphasis on protecting creditors. According to La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998), Germany is an example of a code law country.  
 
With regard to financial aspects, Nobes (1998) argues that the financial system is a key driver of 
variations in accounting practices. He identifies three financial systems: (1) the capital-market-based system, 
in which prices are established in competitive markets (U.K. and U.S.), (2) the credit-based system: financial 
institutions, in which banks and other financial institutions are dominant (Germany), and (3) the credit-
based system: governmental, in which resources are administered by the government (France and Japan). 
In any given finance system, he makes links between type of finance (strong credit versus strong 
equity) and ownership (insiders versus outsiders). Germany is classified as a typical country that relies 
on strong credit and insiders (the government, banks, families, and other companies).   
 
Nobes & Parker (2016) characterize countries such as Germany (as opposed to countries such 
as the U.S. and U.K.) as having code (common) law systems, weaker (stronger) equity markets, a great 
reliance on debt (equity), which is likely to be provided by banks (the stock market), and a great reliance 
on insider (outsider) ownership, such that the attention will be on creditors’ or stakeholders’ (investors’ 
or shareholders’) protection. This conclusion is consistent with La Porta et al. (1998). Nobes (1998) 
7 
 
argues that credit-based countries will be more concerned with the protection of creditors and 
therefore with the prudent and reliable calculation of distributable and taxable profit. Nobes & Parker 
(2016), Fülbier & Klein (2015) and Doupnik & Perera (2011) find that credit-insider financing systems 
are likely to be associated with code law countries. Fülbier & Klein (2015) also argue that creditor 
protection and the determination of distributable profits and objectivity for the sake of reliable and 
verifiable accounting have emerged as core principles of such systems.  
 
With regard to the regulatory aspects of risk reporting, in 2001, the German Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB) published GAS 5 on risk reporting, which makes Germany unique in being the only 
country to have formally issued a comprehensive accounting standard in this area. As a consequence, 
Dobler (2005, 2008) argues that the German experience may have influenced worldwide accounting 
professionals’ efforts to issue a risk reporting accounting standard. The principal objective under GAS 
5 is to provide users with information that is reliable and relevant for decision making, allowing those 
users to form a better understanding of the risks that could affect the future development of a firm 
(GAS 5: Para 2). While GAS 5 adopts a narrow perspective in defining risk as the possibility of a future 
negative impact on the economic position of a group, it also defines opportunity as the possibility of a 
future positive impact (GAS 5: Para 9). Based on this standard, firms are required to provide disclosure 
on risks that could affect the decisions of users, and this risk information should focus on risks relating 
to the specific circumstances of the group and its business activities. This standard requires an 
appropriate description of risk management to be provided, including the policies, procedures and 
organization of risk management systems.  
 
GAS 5 emphasizes the disclosure of firms’ residual risks, in particular industrial and market 
risks, or any other risks having a significant impact on firms’ existence. All such disclosure should be 
made in firms’ annual report narratives, including a section on Risks and Opportunities or Outlook. 
Despite the fact that listed German firms are formally required to fully adopt IFRS, the Accounting 
Standards Committee of Germany (ASCG) also requires those firms to adopt the main risk reporting 
requirements under GAS 5.3 The ASCG states that “enterprises applying international accounting 
principles shall continue to apply German Accounting Standards (GAS) to the extent international 
                                                          
3 It is notable that GAS 5 is linked with some prior regulations in Germany, such as §§ 289(1), 315(1) HGB as 
amended by the BilReG (the Reform Act on Accounting Regulation) that explicitly require disclosure on risks and 
opportunities. There are related standards relevant to this area, such as GAS 15 (Management Reporting). 
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accounting principles do not include any requirements. This holds especially for the German 
Accounting Standards concerning risk reporting and management reporting” (GAS 5).4  
 
Taken all together, and as illustrated in Figure 1, we derive the key environmental factors (risk, 
ownership structure, capital structure, external equity finance, and borrowing) from the principal distinct 
institutional features in Germany. The following section investigates the question of  how and to what 
extent firms’ riskiness and the nature (capital structure and ownership structure) and type of  their funding 
(external equity finance and borrowing) influence German firms’ provision of  risk information. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1. Environmental factors and risk reporting  
3.1.1. Firm riskiness   
The manager’s decision over whether to reveal or conceal information can be explained partly by 
specific factors (such as IFRS and GAS requirements) and also on the basis that the German culture 
tends to score highly on uncertainty avoidance. If  firms have high levels of  risk, this increases the 
uncertainty levels for the public and investors. German regulators demand that German firms reveal 
more risk information than is required by IFRS and GAS 5. According to signaling theory, the 
managers of  German firms are also motivated to disclose more risk information around how they 
effectively identify and manage their risks, as a signaling device to distinguish themselves from other 
companies that do not manage risks or do so less effectively. 
 
Consistent with this view, and based on the general disclosure literature, Cormier, Magnan, & 
Velthoven (2005) find a positive association between German firms’ betas and their environmental 
disclosure levels. With regard to risk reporting in other contexts, Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey 
(2013) find that U.K. non-financial firms are likely to reveal risk information as a response to their 
underlying riskiness (e.g., market beta). These findings are consistent with those of  Campbell et al. 
(2014) for U.S. firms. In terms of  risk reporting in Germany, Elshandidy et al. (2015) argue that firms 
are likely to respond to the pressure that arises from an increase in risk by exhibiting more risk 
information to meet social expectations and appear socially legitimate. Managers will be motivated to 
stay consistent with similar firms that respond to high levels of  risk by disclosing more risk 
                                                          
4 See the following link that relates to the ASCG frequently asked questions service (number 16) for more details: 
http://www.drsc.de/service/faqs/index_en.php?ixfaqs_lang=en&ixfaqs_do=index&ixfaqs_do=show_faq&faq_id=16 
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information. This confirmatory behavior reassures their investors of  their ability to identify and 
manage risks effectively, raising their status. Elshandidy et al.’s (2015) findings support the argument 
that German firms are willing to reveal significant risk information in response to their underlying 
risks (i.e., market beta). In contrast to this, Dobler et al. (2011) find that systematic risk, measured by 
market beta, does not greatly alter German firms’ propensity to provide risk information. Despite this, 
Germany’s accounting characteristics suggest that German firms are incentivized to produce a high 
level of  risk reporting so as to explain their risk exposure and risk management and thus mitigate the 
effects of  the high tendency for uncertainty avoidance in the German culture. This leads to the 
formulation of  the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, German firms’ risk levels positively influence the level of  aggregate risk reporting. 
 
3.1.2. Ownership structure 
Agency theory suggests that aligning the conflicting interests of  a firm’s different parties requires it to 
reveal more information so as to reduce the information asymmetry and monitoring costs among the 
parties. Corporate disclosure mitigates agency costs that increase (decrease) as a function of  the extent 
of  outsider (insider) ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In a situation in which ownership is 
dispersed among shareholders, they are likely to have incentives to monitor the management, as the 
benefits of  such monitoring will offset the associated costs (and vice versa). Particularly, firms that 
have higher levels of  outsider ownership will have incentives to reveal more risk information than 
other firms in order to enable those investors to adjust their portfolios. Failing to provide proper risk 
information (related to the identification, measurement and management of  a firm’s risks) is likely to 
increase investors’ uncertainty and their required rate of  return.  
 
Prior research documents negative associations between the concentration of  ownership and 
general voluntary disclosure (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). These findings 
also apply to risk reporting studies, as evidenced by Abraham & Cox (2007). More recently, however, 
Elshandidy & Neri (2015) did not find concentrated ownership to have a significant influence on risk 
reporting practices in Italian and U.K. firms. 
 
Within the German context, Cormier et al. (2005) find that ownership structure, for which they 
use concentrated ownership (proxied by closely held shares) and foreign ownership (proxied by the 
proportion of  foreign holdings), significantly increases German firms’ likelihood of  providing 
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environmental information in their narratives. We know very little, however, about how ownership 
structure influences German firms’ risk disclosure. In this regard, and based upon the literature on 
corporate disclosure, we expect to see a significant association between ownership structure (i.e., 
outsider ownership, employee-held shares, and foreign ownership) within the German context and 
risk reporting. This leads to the formulation of  the following unidirectional hypothesis: 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, German firms’ ownership structure influences the level of  aggregate risk reporting. 
 
3.1.3. Capital structure  
Fatemi & Luft (2002) provide a theoretical analysis of  how capital structure influences risk activities 
(i.e., identification, measurement, and disclosure). They explain that the capacity of  a firm’s debt is a 
function of  two sequential factors: (1) the stability of  cash flows, which in turn determines (2) the 
required rate of  the bondholders. Their analysis identifies situations in which it is necessary to engage 
in risk activities on the basis of  different probabilities of  default due to different levels of  reliance on 
debt. In this way, capital structure might be considered a key factor that influences risk reporting, 
particularly for firms that rely heavily on debt. Firms holding high levels of  debt have an incentive to 
disclose more information in order to protect themselves from potential damage (Skinner, 1994; 
Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010).  
 
The extant evidence on the impact of  leverage on risk reporting is, however, somewhat mixed. 
Within the U.K. context, some empirical research shows that firms will be likely to reveal more risk 
information if  they have higher levels of  leverage, as the latter would indicate greater financing risks. 
Thus, firms disclose information to reduce their investors’ uncertainty (Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Marshall & Weetman, 2007). In contrast, Linsley & Shrives (2006) find that leverage does not impact 
on the firm’s decision to reveal risk information. Similarly, within the German context, the empirical 
findings on risk reporting are mixed. Dobler et al. (2011) find a negative association between risk 
reporting and leverage for German manufacturing firms. They relate this result to “a concealing 
motive” produced by banks acting as insiders in the German financial setting. Another contrast occurs 
in a recent study in which Elshandidy et al. (2015) find that German firms are likely to reveal more 
risk information voluntarily when they have higher levels of  leverage. We thus expect to find an 
association between risk reporting and the level of  leverage as firms hope to reduce the risk associated 
with the increase in debt usage. This discussion leads to the formulation of  the following 
unidirectional hypothesis: 
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H1c: Ceteris paribus, German firms’ capital structure influences the level of  aggregate risk reporting. 
 
3.1.4. External equity finance and borrowings 
Obtaining cheap external funds is essential for the creation of  firm value through a lower required 
rate of  return. Firms could be forced to reject profitable projects if  they have difficulty gaining access 
to appropriate external finance sources. In theory, disclosure can be seen as a tool for mitigating 
information asymmetry between insiders (whether management or informed investors) and outsiders 
(either the public or uninformed investors) and therefore reducing the cost of  external funds relative 
to internal funds (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Francis, Khurana, & Pereira, 2005).  
 
Firms’ decisions over whether or not to disclose more risk information in their narratives can 
be influenced by many factors. First, the trade-off  between the costs and benefits of  disclosure must 
be considered; firms will try to optimize their level of  disclosure by comparing the potential damage 
from revealing proprietary information to the benefits of  obtaining lower external funds (e.g., Francis 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, firms may disclose information in order to reduce adverse selection, as 
increased disclosure should enhance market liquidity. Korajczyk, Lucas, & McDonald (1991, 1992) 
argue that the decision to raise capital is likely to be influenced by information asymmetry, and find 
that firms tend to raise new capital in periods when the information asymmetry between firm insiders 
and outside investors is low.   
 
Consistent with Nobes (1998) and based on the institutional analysis for the German context 
discussed in Section 2, borrowing would be a more important source of  finance for German firms 
than equity finance. The impact of  borrowing (equity finance) in terms of  motivating managers to 
reveal risk information might rely on two competing arguments. The first is based on the fact that the 
majority (minority) of  German firms’ borrowing (equity) comes from banks (investors) that are 
already invested in the firms. It might be argued, therefore, that there will be a disincentive to reveal 
more risk information externally, as creditors (investors) would be able to obtain such information 
from internal (other) sources. The second argument posits that German firms would increase their 
level of  risk reporting in response to a demand from creditors (investors) that they insure the market 
against related risks. This leads to the following unidirectional hypothesis:      
H1d: Ceteris paribus, German firms’ external equity finance and borrowing influence the level of  aggregate risk 
reporting. 
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3.2. The usefulness of  risk information  
This section examines the impact of  aggregate risk reporting levels and tone (good or bad news) on 
market liquidity and investor-perceived risk. The paper examines market liquidity, as it has a strong 
theoretical link to disclosure (e.g., Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Beyer et al., 
2010), and liquidity can be measured accurately over a short interval (Christensen, Hail, & Leuz, 2013). 
Our interest in investor-perceived risk stems from the underlying notion of  high uncertainty avoidance 
as a unique feature of  the German culture, as discussed in Section 2.  
 
3.2.1. Market liquidity 
Economic theory suggests that firms that provide high-quality voluntary disclosure are likely to 
decrease information asymmetry and adverse selection, thus improving their stock liquidity (e.g., 
Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Beyer et al., 2010). Bertomeu, Beyer, & Dye 
(2011) argue that information asymmetry may be successfully decreased by the disclosure of  more 
information, under one or both of  the following conditions: the firms’ managers have less sensitive 
information; there is an overlap between the managers’ private information and that of  the informed 
traders. Grüning (2011) explains two links between information asymmetry and a firm’s stock liquidity. 
First, if  the information is better allocated in the market, the possibility of  passive traders making 
losses will be reduced, which reduces the actual spread. Second, a lower spread motivates passive 
traders to exit the market since their offers will not attract active traders. This suggests that, with a 
decrease in the bid-ask spread, the market for the stock will see improved liquidity.  
 
Ball, Robin, & Wu (2003) argue that in code law countries, such as Germany, information 
asymmetry is likely to be resolved by institutional features such as the close relation between 
stakeholders, and also the close tie between the management and insider ownership. In such 
circumstances, there will be a lower demand for high quality public financial reporting and disclosure. 
They also argue that another related institutional factor that also reduces the demand for disclosure is 
the prominence of  banks as suppliers of  capital, together with the banks’ close ties to companies.  
 
Prior risk reporting research within the U.S. context directly measures the information content 
of  risk reporting in the 10-K form required in SEC filings. Campbell et al. (2014) find that a greater 
quantity (length) of  risk factor disclosure (identified as Item 1A, a compulsory requirement of  the 
SEC since 2005) reduces information asymmetry and this increases the market liquidity (as proxied by 
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the bid-ask spread). Based on analyzing 30 types of  risk disclosure disclosed in 10-K filings, Bao & 
Datta (2014) find that two-thirds of  these risk types lack informativeness and have no significant 
influence. 
 
There is no prior empirical evidence on whether risk information will improve the German 
market liquidity. If  German firms provide their investors with risk information in response to 
environmental or other factors, as posited in the previous hypotheses, then evaluating the usefulness 
of  the content of  this information becomes a key empirical question. Answering such a question 
would be of  interest to both German regulators and investors. For regulators, finding evidence on the 
provision of  risk information in an environment that is highly regulated towards risk disclosure would 
shed light on whether German firms meet their investors’ needs or just provide generic disclosures to 
comply with risk regulations. For investors, it is important to examine whether risk information is 
reliable and relevant. This can be determined by looking at the degree to which investors will 
comprehend the information and then incorporate it into their price decisions, something that will 
ultimately improve market liquidity by reducing information asymmetry between management and 
investors. Arguably, the mandatory nature of  risk information in Germany might support this 
information being boiler-plate. However, as there is no prior empirical evidence, we formulate the 
following unidirectional hypothesis:  
H2a: Ceteris paribus, the level and tone of  aggregate risk reporting by German firms is likely to be associated 
with market liquidity.  
 
3.2.2. Investor-perceived risk 
Revealing information about risk is an essential requirement according to many professional initiatives 
that have been launched (e.g., in the U.K., ICAEW 1997, 1999 and 2011; in the U.S., FRR 48). Again, 
the main purpose of  disclosing this information is to reduce investors’ uncertainty, which reduces the 
required rate of  return due to the lower level of  risk. As explained in the previous section, Germany’s 
high score on uncertainty avoidance could explain the country’s highly regulated environment for risk 
information relative to other countries such as the U.K. This makes investor-perceived risk an 
important indicator to look at in relation to risk information. Making a distinction between good 
(favorable) and bad (unfavorable) news from three sources – annual reports, analyst reports, and the 
business press – Kothari et al. (2009) use content analysis to analyze the impact on risk measures 
including the cost of  capital, the volatility of  stock returns and the volatility of  analyst forecast errors. 
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Focusing on the results of  corporate reporting, they find that good news disclosure reduces the 
volatility of  stock returns, whereas bad news disclosure seems to lack the credibility to influence the 
perceived risk, possibly due to such information being out of  date. Likewise, Akhigbe & Martin (2008) 
find that the financial market rewards firms with high disclosure through lower movements in those 
risk measures (volatility, systematic and unsystematic risk), over either 300 (the long term) or 200 (the 
short term) days.  
 
Kravet & Muslu (2013) argue that if  risk reporting introduces unknown risk factors, users are 
likely to change their future predictions and become less confident. This argument suggests that 
providing risk information could be related to an increase in the level of  risk, as may be proxied by 
the volatility of  stock returns. However, another argument claims that if  risk reporting does not 
surprise investors but provides information that is related to known risk factors, then such disclosure 
is likely to increase investors’ confidence by reducing perceived risk. Campbell et al. (2014) and Kravet 
& Muslu (2013) find that risk information levels in Item 1A of  the 10-K filings increase investor-
perceived risk. 
 
Based on the current evidence from theoretical and empirical research, risk-related information 
might either increase or decrease the perceived risk, depending on whether the revealed risk 
information conveys unknown or known risk factors. This discussion leads to the following 
unidirectional hypothesis:  
H2b: Ceteris paribus, the level and tone of  aggregate risk reporting by German firms is likely to be related to investor-
perceived risk.  
 
4. Research method 
4.1. Sample selection and data collection 
We obtained a list of  Frankfurt all-share firms from Thomson One Banker. We excluded financial 
firms, as in prior research (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Elshandidy et al., 2013), because of  their distinct 
regulations and accounting practices. This resulted in an initial list comprising 716 firms (see Appendix 
1). Firms whose annual reports were offered only in German (497 firms) were also excluded, leaving 
219 firms that provide their annual reports in English (either written completely in English or written 
in German with an English translation provided by the firm). That choice is consistent with the 
empirical evidence of  Campbell, Beck, & Shrives (2005), who support the use of  translated German 
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annual reports since they convey the same context as the originals. Our choice is also consistent with 
recent research on general disclosure. For instance, Lang & Stice-Lawrence (2015) exclude non-
English versions from their textual investigation into the incentives for and market reaction to the 
contents of  annual report narratives following the mandatory adoption of  IFRS. Recent research on 
risk reporting in Germany has also utilized annual reports written in English (Elshandidy et al., 2015; 
Dobler et al., 2011). Firms cross-listed in the U.S. (five firms) were also excluded as they are subject 
to cross-regulations on risk reporting (Abraham & Cox, 2007). 
 
The annual reports of  the sample were collected from either Thomson One Banker or company 
websites. All reports were for financial years ending within the period from January 2005 to December 
2009. This time period was chosen as IFRS became mandatory for German listed companies in 2005. 
A number of  annual reports were excluded for a variety of  reasons. Firms with a fiscal year end other 
than December 31 (14 firms) were excluded in order to inspect the impact of  risk information in an 
accurate and timely fashion, as it became publicly available, on the market indicators (market liquidity 
and investor-perceived risk). All annual reports had to be converted into text files in order to be 
readable by QSR version 6 and those that could not be converted were excluded (15 firms). In 
addition, we excluded firms that followed the U.S. GAAP during 2005 and 2006 (14 firms), as this 
option was initially available for German firms as an alternative to the mandatory adoption of  IFRS 
in 2005. Finally, any firm without a complete (five-year) time series of  both annual reports and market 
data was omitted (28 firms). Consequently, as can be seen from Appendix 1, the total size of  the 
sample is 143 firms (715 firm-years).5  
 
4.2. Textual analysis steps 
Three successive steps, shown in Figure 2, were utilized to measure the risk-related disclosure scores 
in the narrative sections of  the German firms’ annual reports over the five-year period. First, in order 
to determine the final risk word list, we identified a comprehensive list of  risk-related keywords based 
on three main sources: (1) we built an initial list based on prior academic and professional research on 
risk concepts (Luhmann, 1996); (2) following similar textual analysis research (see e.g. Elshandidy et 
al., 2013; Wang & Hussainey, 2013), this word list was expanded with relevant synonyms obtained 
                                                          
5 Those firms represent eight industries (classified according to the Industry Classification Benchmark [ICB]), 
namely, materials, industrials, consumer goods, health care, consumer services, telecommunication, utilities, and 
technology. 
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using Roget’s Thesaurus; (3) consistent with Kravet & Muslu (2013), 15 annual report narratives were 
randomly selected and read to identify additional words indicating risk. Consistent with both academic 
(Abdel-Khalik, 2013) and professional (GAS 5: Para 9) research on risk reporting, our list of  risk 
words relies on a broad approach to defining risk that encompasses not only the negative side such as 
potential losses/threats but also the positive side reflecting potential gains and opportunities. To test 
the extent to which the words featured in the resulting list were in use, an intensive text search, using 
QSR version 6, was conducted for another 15 randomly selected annual reports. Any words that did 
not appear in this text search were excluded (words such as dare and diminish). In this way, we 
identified a final complete risk word list comprising the following terms: risk*, loss*, decline (declined), 
decrease (decreased), less, low*, fail (failure), threat, reverse (reversed), viable, against, catastrophe 
(catastrophic), shortage, unable, challenge (challenges), uncertain (uncertainty, uncertainties), gain 
(gains), chance (chances), increase (increased), peak (peaked), fluctuate*, differ*, diversify*, probable* 
and significant*. For words followed by the symbol *, we also included derivatives of  the original.  
 
Second, we counted all the statements in the narrative sections of  the annual reports that 
contained at least one word from our final list. Counting the number of  statements that indicate risk 
regardless of  how many times a certain word is repeated overcomes the problem of  double-counting 
(Kravet & Muslu, 2013), which is an inherent issue of  all dictionary-based software programs (e.g., 
General Inquiry, which was used by Kothari et al., 2009). This generated a score that we used as a 
measure of  the aggregate risk reporting of  each firm.  
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Third, each statement that counted towards the aggregated score for each firm was further 
classified based on its tone (good or bad news). We did this by reclassifying our original risk word list 
based on whether each word reflected good news (upside, indicating potential gains) or bad news 
(downside, indicating potential losses). We identified negative risk reporting scores (bad news about 
risk) by counting the number of  statements that contained at least one of  the following words: against, 
catastrophe (catastrophic), challenge (challenges), decline (declined), decrease (decreased), fail (failure), 
less, loss (losses), low*, risk*, shortage, threat, unable, uncertain (uncertainty, uncertainties), reverse 
(reversed). Similarly, we identified positive scores (good news about risk) by counting the number of  
statements that contained at least one of  the following words: chance (chances), diversify*, gain 
(gains), increase (increased), peak (peaked). Again, for words denoted by the symbol *, we also 
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included derivatives of  the original.6 Additionally, we recorded the “net tone of  risk” by observing the 
net difference between good and bad news about risk. Appendix 3 provides examples of  each type of  
risk-related disclosure.  
 
4.3. The reliability and validity of  the risk-related disclosure scores 
The reliability and validity of the risk reporting scores were checked in three stages. First, we examined 
the extent to which the final word list captured statements in the firms’ annual report narratives with 
a risk focus. To this end, we read 30 randomly selected statements from the QSR version 6 output for 
15 firms. We found the final risk word list to be very successful (80% on average) in identifying 
statements indicative of risk. Second, Cronbach’s alpha was used as a statistical test to examine the 
reliability of the aggregate risk reporting scores and tone of risk (good news, bad news, and net tone 
of risk). This test measures how effectively a data set captures a particular underlying construct. For 
the computed risk reporting scores, Cronbach’s alpha equalled 92.6%, indicating that internal 
consistency between the aggregate risk reporting and its tone is high when compared with the generally 
accepted figure from social science of around 70% (Abraham & Cox, 2007). Finally, we also validated 
our risk disclosure scores by comparing our word list with that of Kravet & Muslu (2013), who suggest 
a risk word list containing the following words (where * implies that suffixes are allowed): can/cannot, 
could, may, might, risk*, uncertain*, likely to, subject to, potential*, vary*/varies, depend*, expose*, 
fluctuate*, possible*, susceptible, affect, influence* and hedge*. To that end, and based on that list, 
we generated risk disclosure scores for our full sample in 2007. Our results show that the correlation 
between the two lists was significantly high (around 94%), suggesting that the two lists in common 
capture a large proportion of risk disclosure from the narrative sections of annual reports. Similarity 
with Kravet & Muslu’s (2013) work provides further evidence of our word list’s validity and thus we 
can conclude that our computed disclosure scores are reliable. 
4.4. Empirical model 
To examine how environmental factors (firms’ riskiness, nature of funding including ownership structure 
and capital structure, and type of funding including external equity finance and borrowing) affect aggregate 
risk reporting (H1), this paper utilizes the following equation:7  
                                                          
6 We excluded neutral words that reflected neither the up nor the downside, such as significant, probable, and 
differ. 
7 It is notable that, because we rely on the standardized coefficient approach, the intercept term in both Equation 
1 and Equation 2 is equal to zero, since β0 =µy˗β1 µx1˗β2 µx2=0-0-0=0.  
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(1)  
Definitions, measures and sources of all variables are detailed in Appendix 2. We also controlled for 
other factors that might influence German firm managers’ decision to disclose certain risk information 
in narrative sections of  the annual report. These factors included dividend payout, liquidity, profitability, 
growth, firm size, and the length of  the annual report.  
 
Dividend payout: German firms might pay relatively higher dividends (vis-à-vis U.S. firms; see 
Elshandidy et al., 2015) to compensate investors for high risk, and that might affect their level of  risk 
reporting. Firm liquidity: Cormier et al. (2005) suggest that highly liquid firms are motivated to disclose 
more information than less liquid firms. However, findings showed (in line with research by Marshall 
& Weetman, 2007) that liquidity has a significant and negative impact on the disclosure level. Firm 
profitability: Elshandidy et al. (2013) and Miihkinen (2012) find that poorly performing firms are 
incentivized to reveal significantly higher levels of  risk reporting than profitable firms, which is 
consistent with a German study by Elshandidy et al. (2015). Firm growth: Khurana, Raynolde, & Xiumin 
(2006) argue that, as disclosure enhances the ability to obtain external financing by reducing 
information asymmetry, firm growth is likely to be positively related to the disclosure level. Their 
empirical evidence supports this, in line with the work of  Chavent, Ding, Stolowy, & Wang (2006).  
Firm size: The theoretical basis for controlling for size, as a firm-specific factor, rests on the fact that 
providing such information is costly. Large firms are likely to have a greater ability to gather and 
prepare information to a reasonable level than smaller firms and research to date is consistent with 
this (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Miihkinen, 2012). Finally (Length of  annual report), any observed variation 
in risk reporting level between German firms might be influenced by the length of  the narrative 
sections of  those firms’ annual reports (Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2015). Accordingly, 
we expect that German firms’ dividend payout, liquidity, profitability, growth, size, and length of  the 
annual report might all, together or individually, affect the level of  firms’ risk reporting. 
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The following equation examines the extent to which the various characteristics of  risk-related 
disclosure (namely aggregate level and tone) are useful by examining the impact on market liquidity 
and investor-perceived risk (H2): 
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(2) 
While all independent variables (risk-related disclosure and control factors) in Equation 2 are measured 
at fiscal year-end t, the dependent variables (market liquidity and investor-perceived risk) are measured 
as the average of  a three-month (from May to July) period based on daily prices, the bid-ask spread 
being our proxy for market liquidity (following Campbell et al., 2014) and the volatility of  stock returns 
being our measure for investor-perceived risk (following Kravet & Muslu, 2013). These market 
measures are inspected over those three months so as to ensure that the accounting information is 
publicly available to investors, since German firms must make their annual reports available four 
months after their financial year-end (December 31).  
 
All variables common to both equations have the same definition in each, as shown in Appendix 
2. Additionally, Equation 2 introduces book to market (BTM) and trading volume into the set of  control 
variables since they are frequently used in prior research on the usefulness of  risk disclosure. Campbell 
et al. (2014) and Elshandidy & Neri (2015) find a negative association between BTM and market 
liquidity. We therefore control for this factor and expect a negative coefficient. BTM is measured as 
the book value of  equity divided by the market value of  equity. Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) find that 
the trading volume is negatively associated with the relative spread. The trading volume is measured by 
dividing the daily trading volume, that is, the number of  shares traded on day i, by the number of  
outstanding shares.  
 
We relied on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in both equations, after accounting for 
both year- and industry-fixed effects in order to control for unobserved industry heterogeneity, since 
we were interested in observing variations over time: in aggregate risk reporting in Equation 1 and in 
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market indicators (market liquidity and investor-perceived risk) in Equation 2. Furthermore, in both 
equations the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted. To mitigate the problem of  outliers, our 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. To assess the overall significance for 
each model, we report F-statistics, the test statistics for the analysis of  variance (ANOVA), and indicate 
their significance, all of  which confirm the overall significance of  the models. All of the variables’ 
definitions, measures, and sources are provided in Appendix 2.  
 
5. Results  
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent (risk reporting in Equation 1 and the 
market indicators in Equation 2), independent (environmental incentive factors in Equation 1, and 
risk reporting and its tone in Equation 2), and control variables. Over the five-year period of  the study, 
German firms tended to disclose almost 276 (2.7182818^5.620) statements indicating risk, on average, 
based on our final word list. While there were, on average, 106 (2.7182818^4.667) statements 
indicating good news associated with risk, there were 112 (2.7182818^4.719) that indicated bad news. 
The remainder of  the statements (58) were neutral in tone as concerns risk disclosure. Thus German 
firms, on average, tend to be marginally less (more) optimistic (pessimistic) when conveying 
information related to their risks. The shape of  the aggregate risk reporting graph and its tone, not 
reported, is negatively skewed, indicating that German firms tend to reduce their level of  risk reporting 
in certain years; consider, for example, the behavior of  German firms during the recent financial crisis 
(analyzed further in Section 5.4). Furthermore, the length of  the narrative sections of  the annual 
reports studied over the five-year period was, on average, 1,556 (2.7182818^7.350) statements. Thus, 
on average almost 18% of  that narrative disclosure was related to risk.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 provides Pearson correlation coefficients in respect of  every variable. It shows a positive 
association between the level of  aggregate risk reporting and its tone, thereby suggesting that German 
firms significantly use the tone of  information to convey messages about risks included within their 
aggregate risk disclosures. While the optimistic (net) tone of  risk was not significantly associated with 
the total amount of  risk German firms tended to reveal in their narrative sections, it was significantly 
and positively (negatively) related to the good (bad) news disclosed about risk. It is notable that 
revealing good and/or bad news might be associated with the underlying performance or firm 
profitability. The results suggest that German firms that perform well (badly) are likely to reveal a 
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considerable proportion of  good (bad) news within their risk disclosure. To extend our conclusions 
based on the correlation analysis for each pair of  variables, the following sub-sections discuss the 
multivariate regression analyses.8    
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5.2. Results for H1, based on Equation 1: Environmental incentives for aggregate risk reporting  
This section addresses the extent to which the environmental factors influence German firms’ 
decision over whether to disclose risk information in their annual report narratives. Our three models 
referred to in Table 3 answer this question and test our first set of  hypotheses. As regards Model 1 
(where there is full consideration of  all factors), we find that highly risky firms are likely to have a 
strong incentive to reveal significantly more risk information in the narrative sections of  their annual 
reports (t-statistic 2.043 at 5% significance level). Statistically, a one standard deviation (0.362) increase 
in a firm’s riskiness (market beta) would result in a 0.022 (0.054*0.411) increase in aggregate risk 
reporting. Equally, a one standard deviation increase in a firm’s riskiness leads to a 0.054 standard 
deviation increase in aggregate risk reporting. This supports H1a. Facing substantial risk exposure has 
a significant influence on managers’ decision over whether to reveal or conceal information about 
their risks. Our result is consistent with the expectation that German firms with higher levels of  risk 
would be likely to provide significantly higher levels of  risk information (including details of  those 
risks and how they were being mitigated). Managers will be motivated to provide such information 
within the German context (bearing in mind the culture of  uncertainty avoidance) to avoid potential 
misinterpretation of  their riskiness. These results are consistent with prior literature on risk reporting 
(e.g., Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2015).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Turning to the control variables, as can be seen under Model 1 of  Table 3, managers of  firms 
paying lower dividends have incentives to reveal risk information (t-statistic -2.305 at 5% significance 
level). This result is consistent with Elshandidy & Neri’s (2015) findings: They argue, based on agency 
theory, that dividend policies are a way of  dealing with agency problems that relate to corporate 
insiders and outsiders, and thus that high dividend payments are associated with less riskiness and thus 
lower levels of  risk reporting.  
                                                          
8 In order to test whether our variables exhibit the problem of  multi-collinearity, we calculate variance inflation 
factors (VIFs). All VIFs are below 10, ranging between 1.78 and 3.80, which indicates that none of  the variables studied 
suffers from this problem (Campbell et al., 2014). 
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As can be seen under Model 1 of  Table 3, German firms that are larger and those that have 
longer annual reports convey more risk information (both at significance levels of  1%). Arguably, 
larger German firms are likely to have the resources to build strong risk management systems, as a 
result of  which they will be able to manage their risk effectively and will therefore be likely to convey 
information about their risks in order to make a distinction between themselves and other firms that 
either do not engage in risk management or do so less effectively. Variations in risk reporting across 
German firms are significantly attributable to variations in the length of  the annual reports, suggesting 
the importance of  controlling for this factor in disclosure studies. This result is consistent with the 
most recent evidence in the risk reporting literature (Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2015). 
 
Model 2 of  Table 3 also examines the impact of  the environmental factors, along with some 
other factors that strongly reflect managers’ incentives (all control factors shown under Model 1 after 
the omission of  firm size and length of  annual report), on risk reporting. The three environmental 
factors that dominate are risk, capital structure and employee-held shares. Among those factors, risk 
appears to be the most influential of  the environmental and control factors in motivating German 
managers to reveal information about their risks. The impact of  risk on the revealing of  risk 
information is found to be 110% (|1-0.191/0.090|*100), 125% (|1-0.191/0.085|*100), 65% (|1-
0.191/0.116|*100) and 1% (|1-0.191/0.189|*100) greater than the impacts of  employee-held shares, 
dividend payout, liquidity, and capital structure, respectively. Furthermore, based on Model 3 of  Table 
3, we draw the same conclusion after examining the impact of  just the environmental factors on risk 
reporting. 9 
 
These results have both theoretical and practical implications. On the one hand, they contribute 
to the ongoing debate around whether and the extent to which the distinct characteristics of  the 
German context influence accounting practices despite the converging influence of  IFRS. Our results 
are relatively consistent with research that documents a moderate influence of  German characteristics 
on German accounting practices (see Dittmann et al., 2010). On the other hand, these results show 
that distinct environmental barriers could also partly explain the deviations in risk reporting between 
                                                          
9 In terms of  the main determinants of  good and bad news about risk, our unreported results reveal that, while 
good news is influenced significantly by borrowing, growth, firm, and the length of  the annual report, bad news is 
influenced significantly by the dividend payout, profitability, firm size, and the length of  the annual report.  
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German firms. This may help us to understand why risk reporting differences exist, and facilitate 
international efforts towards harmonization. 
 
5.3. Results for H2, based on Equation 2: The usefulness of  risk reporting 
5.3.1. Market liquidity (H2a) 
Model 1 of  Table 4 shows that the aggregate risk information does not have a significant impact in 
terms of  improving the market liquidity between participants, suggesting that investors do not 
incorporate this kind of  disclosure into their decision making. It also supports the idea that German 
firms tend to provide this disclosure in a somewhat “boiler-plate” fashion (i.e., generic disclosures that 
fail to provide any information content). Firms’ managers are sensitive about bringing private 
information to the public’s attention as it may incite unwanted actions from third parties (e.g., 
suppliers, customers, or debt holders) that in turn could reduce its cash flows (Verrecchia, 1983). For 
example, the disclosed information could prompt a review of  contractual obligations. In such highly 
uncertain circumstances, firms may also be disinclined to disclose any information that might harm 
their competitive position in the market. 
 
Once we made distinctions depending on the tone of  the aggregate risk reporting, under Model 
2 of  Table 4, we found that investors reacted to the tone of  the news significantly. In particular, 
investors reacted positively to risk disclosure categorized as good news, leading to a significant 
improvement in market liquidity (t-statistic -2.091 at the 5% significance level). Specifically, a one 
standard deviation increase in good (bad news) about risk would result in a 0.002 (0.117*0.013) 
increase (a 0.001, 0.102*0.013) (decrease) in market liquidity.  In addition, investors tended to react 
negatively to the disclosure of  risk information associated with bad news, suggesting that German 
firms that revealed more bad news about risk alerted investors’ attention, resulting in a decrease in the 
market’s liquidity (t-statistic 2.001 at the 5% significance level). Our result also suggests that market 
liquidity is more associated with good news than bad news by 15% (|1-0.117/0.102|*100), which is 
consistent with both the theoretical argument of  Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) and the empirical 
results of  Grüning (2011). To investigate the impact of  the net tone of  risk reporting on market 
liquidity, we adjusted the good news scores by excluding the bad news scores. Model 3 of  Table 4 
reveals that investors tended to react more sensitively to the net tone of  risk – which reflects the 
optimistic tone of  such disclosure as captured by the difference between the good and bad news about 
risk – than to the aggregate risk reporting. This information seems to convey firm-specific information 
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(t-statistic -2.184 at the 5% significance level) which subsequently improves market liquidity. The above 
results generally support the argument that risk reporting increases market liquidity. These findings 
lead us to partially accept H2a.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
5.3.2. Investor-perceived risk (H2b) 
Model 4 of  Table 4 shows that the German market does not respond to higher levels of  aggregate 
risk reporting by lowering investor-perceived risk. This result is consistent with our findings under 
Model 1. It is also consistent with the theoretical argument of  Barry & Brown (1985) who explain that 
investors are likely to estimate the risk of  firms that provide relatively little information as higher than 
that of  firms that provide more information. Finally, it is consistent with the empirical results of  
Akhigbe & Martin (2008).  
 
Under Model 5 of  Table 4, when we distinguish between the tone of  each risk statement, the 
results reveal that investors are likely to react more significantly to good news (potential gains or 
opportunities) than they do to bad news (potential losses), and to correct their pre-judgments on the 
uncertainty related to their investment (t-statistics -2.873 for good news and 2.296 for bad news at the 
1% and 5% significance levels, respectively). Statistically, a one standard deviation increase in good 
(bad news) about risk would result in a 0.018 (0.134*0.135) decrease (a 0.011 [0.109*0.135*100] 
increase) in investor-perceived risk. The result shows that investors within the German context look 
more positively (negatively) upon the disclosure of  good (bad) news about their risks, and that 
significantly diminishes (increases) their perceived risk. The impact of  good news about risk on 
investor-perceived risk is 197% (|1-0.134/0.045|*100) more than the impact of  aggregate risk 
reporting. Consistent with our findings under market liquidity, the market is likely to react more (by 
23%, [|1-0.134/0.109|*100]) to good news than to bad news. Our findings for both good and bad 
news about risk are consistent with the argument of  Kravet & Muslu (2013) that risk information 
might increase (decrease) investor-perceived risk if  it conveys unknown (known) information, such as 
bad (good) news about risk. Furthermore, Model 6 of  Table 4 shows that the net tone of  risk 
reporting, which reflects the optimistic tone of  that risk disclosure, significantly influences investors 
by reducing their implied volatility due to their reliance on the revealed information. These findings 
lead us to partially accept H2b.   
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Collectively, these results have both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretical impacts 
stem from the importance of  distinguishing between good and bad news about risk within aggregate 
risk reporting, particularly when investigating the usefulness of  disclosure in general, as recommended 
by Kothari et al. (2009), or risk information in particular, thereby answering Kravet & Muslu’s (2013) 
call for aggregate risk information to be further classified according to its tone. 10 
 
5.4. Further analysis 
5.4.1. Financial crisis 
Due to the fact that the sample period for this paper covers the financial crisis period of  2008, we 
introduce dummy variables for the periods before, during, and after the crisis so as to inspect and 
compare how German firms behaved during these three periods. Model 1 of  Table 5 indicates that, 
before the financial crisis, German firms tended to provide less risk information than during or after 
it. These results suggest that the firms appear to have been more concerned with avoiding high non-
compliance costs, which are likely to have become more explicit during and after the financial crisis. 
This highlights some of  the criticism of  the regulatory frameworks that tend to appear during and 
after such crises, as witnessed in the American context by the introduction of  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002 after the Enron and World-Com collapses. These results are in line with recent research on 
risk reporting in other jurisdictions, such as Miihkinen (2013) in the Finnish context and Elshandidy 
& Neri (2015) in the U.K. and Italian contexts. 
 
Model 2 of  Table 5 shows that the German firms were likely to provide less good news during 
and after the crisis than prior to it, even though the coefficients on those two variables of  interest 
(during and post-crisis) are not statistically significant. In contrast to that, the coefficients on the during 
and post-crisis variables with respect to bad news concerning risk, as can be seen under Model 3 of  
Table 5, are statistically and economically significant (t-statistics 7.146 and 7.550 respectively at the 1% 
level), suggesting that German firms tended to provide more bad news both during and after the crisis 
than before it. When we look at the optimism (the difference between good and bad news about risk, 
                                                          
10 To ensure that our analysis has not been driven by any special nature of  the year 2005 as a transition year, we 
reran the analysis without 2005 (thus our sample covers 4 years from 2006 onwards). Consistent with previous findings 
discussed in Section 5.2, our unreported analysis, which is available upon request, suggests a moderate effect for 
environmental factors on aggregate risk reporting. It also suggests, consistent with previous findings discussed in Section 
5.3, that the usefulness of  aggregate disclosure was not statistically and economically observable unless a distinction 
between good and bad news about risk was made. 
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i.e., the net tone of  risk), our results suggest that German firms tended to be significantly less 
optimistic both during and after the crisis (t-statistics 8.015 and 9.344, respectively) than prior to it.  
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.5. Robustness checks  
5.5.1. Changes in risk reporting levels 
We inspect whether the deviations in aggregate risk reporting are attributable to the same factors that 
were identified, based on the levels of  aggregate risk reporting, in Table 3. Consistent with Kravet & 
Muslu (2013) and so as to identify either the incentives or the usefulness of  firm-specific risk 
information, we calculate the differences in the aggregate scores, good news and bad news scores and 
the median of  aggregate risk reporting and its tone (good and bad news), between each firm and the 
scores of  other firms within the same industry over the five-year period. Applying the change model 
that was implemented in Kravet & Muslu (2013) – in lieu of  the risk levels that were implemented in 
Campbell et al. (2014) and Elshandidy et al. (2015) – reduces the potential endogeneity problems, 
which will be analyzed further in the following section.  
 
Model 1 (Panel A of  Table 6) shows that the observed differences in aggregate risk reporting 
between firms and their industry counterparts are likely to be associated with risk, as an environmental 
factor, and by the dividend payout, firm size, and length of  annual report, as control factors. Those 
factors are the same ones that drove the variations in aggregate risk reporting between German firms, 
as concluded from our analyses of  Model 1 of  Table 3.  
 
Models 1 and 4 (Panel B of  Table 6) suggest that changes in aggregate risk reporting do not 
statistically influence investors’ decisions. This result is consistent with that drawn from Models 1 and 
4 of  Table 4. Similarly and consistent with previous results of  Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 of  Table 4, the 
results of  Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 (Panel B of  Table 6) suggest that observed changes in the tone and 
net tone of  risk reporting between German firms and the industry norm are important for investors 
since they enable them to incorporate such information into their price decisions, demonstrating the 
usefulness of  this kind of  information.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.5.2. Endogeneity effects  
We checked whether our previous estimates, shown in Table 3, were subject to an endogeneity 
problem arising from omitted variables and/or simultaneity. The problem of omitted variable bias 
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arises from unobserved heterogeneity in firm-specific and/or time-invariant variables. The omitted 
variables could lead to the incorrect attribution of risk reporting to environmental and/or incentive 
factors.11 This concern, however, can be eliminated by the use of fixed-effects modeling (Brown, 
Beekes, & Verhoeven, 2011). To do this, we ran fixed-effects panel regression to investigate the 
underlying environmental incentives behind the provision of aggregate risk information, as shown 
under Model 1 of  Table 7, and drew the same conclusions as under Model 1 of  Table 3. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Simultaneity or reverse causality arises when significant associations exist between the 
explanatory variables and risk reporting. To remove the possibility of reverse causality, we used lagged 
variables. Following Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard (2009), we regressed the current year’s aggregate risk 
reporting scores on the previous year’s main explanatory variables (environmental and other factors).  
 
The coefficients of  the lagged values of  the environmental and control factors, as shown under 
Model 2 of  Table 7, are generally consistent with our results under Model 1 of  Table 3 and have 
theoretically plausible signs. Our results therefore support the conclusion that environmental factors 
have a moderate effect in motivating German firms to reveal risk information in their narratives.  
 
5.5.3. Comparisons between German firms and matched firms in other countries 
Our results, discussed in 5.2, suggest that risk  is essential factor that significantly influences German 
firms to reveal considerably risk information. This result supports the institutional power of  German 
culture, which places more emphasis on uncertainty avoidance. We provide Appendix 4 which tests 
risk reporting and firms’ riskiness in other countries that have different institutional factors from 
Germany. This appendix shows comparisons of  and differences in aggregate risk reporting and risk 
between German firms and matched firms from U.K. and Italy.12 The graphs of  Panel A of  Appendix 
                                                          
11 We collected data on audit quality, as was helpfully suggested by one of  the referees. We find that while 451 
(72.9%) of  German firms were audited by one of  the big-four auditors, Ernst & Young, Deloitte, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and KPMG, 167(27.1%) of  German firms were audited by one of  the non-big four. In general, 
our unreported analysis, which is available upon request, indicates that audit quality does not significantly influence 
German firms to provide risk information. Further, we still draw the same conclusion on the main drivers that influence 
aggregate risk reporting, discussed in Section 5.2. When we introduce audit quality while observing the usefulness of  risk 
information, we find that the impact of  aggregate risk reporting, good and bad news about risk on market liquidity, and 
investor-perceived risk remain unaffected by this inclusion. 
12 Our choice for these two countries relied on the following: Elshandidy & Neri (2015) argue that these two 
countries offer unique sets of  characteristics and have very different legal origins, the U.K. having a strong common-law 
tradition, and Italy one of  civil law. Further differences in institutional settings include the large stock market, dispersed 
corporate ownership, high level of  investor protection, and strong legal enforcement in the U.K. compared with a less 
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4 suggest that German firms provided more risk information than matched firms in the U.K. and 
Italy. They also suggest that risk levels were higher in matched firms from U.K. and Italy than German 
firms.  
 
Panel B of  Appendix 4 suggests that the means of  aggregate risk reporting and risk in German 
firms are significantly different from the ones observed from matched firms from U.K. and Italy.  
Furthermore, our unreported regression analysis, based for matched firms, suggested that while risk 
significantly influences German firms to exhibit risk information in their narrative sections of  annual 
reports, it does not, however, support significant impact for risk on aggregate risk reporting in 
matched firms from the U.K. and Italy. Taken all together, these results suggest that despite the lower 
levels of  risk of  German firms than risk levels of  matched firms, German firms responded to their 
risk levels by providing significantly higher levels of  risk reporting than  those of  matched firms. 
 
6. Concluding comments  
Making reference to some unique features (e.g., code law, insider market, creditor protection) that 
distinguish the German context from many others such as that of  the U.S. (i.e.. common law, outsider 
market, investor protection), we examine how environmental factors (nature of  funding including 
ownership structure and capital structure, type of  funding including external equity finance and 
borrowing, and riskiness of  funding including risk and uncertainty) affect aggregate risk reporting. 
 
The decision to increase the level of  risk reporting is influenced by firm risk levels (an 
environmental factor) as well as dividends, size, and the length of  the annual report (control factors). 
We find that the decision regarding whether to provide or withhold risk information is unlikely to be 
significantly related to environmental incentives, but is economically and statistically associated with a 
firm’s size and the length of  its annual report, while being moderately influenced by factors such as 
dividends. 
 
These results have both theoretical and practical implications. First, they contribute to the 
ongoing debate around whether, and if  so the extent to which, the distinct characteristics of  the 
                                                          
developed stock market, concentrated ownership, low level of  investor rights, and weak legal enforcement in Italy (La 
Porta et al., 1998). 
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German context influence accounting practices despite the converging influence of  IFRS. Our results 
show that distinct environmental barriers could also partly explain the deviations in risk reporting 
between German firms. This may help us to understand why risk reporting differences exist, and may 
facilitate international efforts towards harmonization. The results also have practical implications for 
investors and other market participants who are likely to look at certain drivers. For instance, if  a firm 
is risky and large and provides lengthy annual reports, it is highly likely that it will provide significantly 
more risk information in its narrative sections than other firms. For policy makers, the results shed 
light on the fact that distinct features (environmental factors) only moderately influence firms’ 
decisions regarding whether to reveal information about their risks.  
 
This paper also examines whether or not risk-related disclosure is useful to the German market. 
The results suggest that the market is likely to react more sensitively to the tone of  risk reporting than 
to the aggregate level of  disclosure that tends to be “boiler-plate.” This adds to the widespread 
discussion by the regulators, especially in the U.S. and U.K., on whether and to what extent corporate 
disclosure in narrative sections conveys credible and relevant information to investors, facilitating their 
decision making and helping them to engage with firms’ activities. The results also lend support to 
annual reports remaining a key source of  information for investors.   
 
There are some avenues for future research based on this paper’s limitations. This paper relies 
on narrative disclosure in annual reports; further research might conduct a content analysis on other 
sources of  information such as financial releases, analyst reports and online reports. The investor-
perceived risk is implicitly measured based on the impact of  risk-related information on the volatility 
of  market returns; however, questionnaires and/or interviews could also be used to explicitly measure 
investors’ real feelings about disclosed information (Koonce, McAnally, & Mercer, 2005). Further 
research might also investigate empirically how institutional factors across countries influence firms’ 
decision on revealing risk information.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Variables  Observations  Mean Median  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk-related disclosure:       
Aggregate risk reporting  715 5.620 5.683 0.411 4.890 6.217 
Good news about risk  715 4.667 4.705 0.440 3.912 5.293 
Bad news about risk 715 4.719 4.753 0.434 3.970 5.357 
Net tone of risk  715 -0.052 -0.058 0.301 -1.444     0.841 
Market indicators:       
Market liquidity  667 0.021 0.018 0.013 0.005 0.045 
Investor-perceived risk 667 0.451 0.441 0.135 0.263 0.685 
Environmental factors:       
Risk  715 0.763 0.756 0.362 0.223 1.317 
Outsider ownership  715 48.957 49.000 24.522 10.000 85.000 
Employee-held shares 715 1.859 1.000 2.248 0.000 6.000 
Foreign ownership 715 1.247 0.000 2.074 0.000 6.000 
Capital structure  715 2.989 3.494 1.704 0.000 5.062 
External equity finance 715 -0.578 -0.061 1.491 -4.375 0.778 
Borrowing  715 0.525 0.020 0.671 0.013 2.000 
Control factors:       
Dividend payout 715 24.061 22.22 23.686 0.000 64.239 
Liquidity 715 1.996 1.750 0.969 0.890 4.070 
Profitability  
715 9.555 10.62 13.159 -18.360 28.650 
Growth 715 0.078 0.045 0.212 -0.248 0.500 
Firm size 715 5.370 5.27 0.694 4.427 6.540 
Length of annual report 715 7.350 7.375 0.433 6.623 8.034 
Book to market (BTM) 667 1.925 1.62 1.045 0.690 3.990 
Trading volume 667 0.095 0.057 0.093 0.009 0.292 
This table presents descriptive statistics (mean, median, and other relevant statistics) for the dependent variables used to test 
H1, which relates to aggregated risk reporting. It also includes dependent variables used to test H2: market indicators 
comprising market liquidity and investor-perceived risk. The independent variables related to H1 include environmental 
factors (risk, ownership including outsider and foreign ownership and employee-held shares, capital structure, and 
types of financing including external equity financing and borrowing) and control factors (dividend payout, liquidity, 
profitability, growth, firm size, and length of annual report). The independent variables related to H2 include risk-related 
disclosure, which includes aggregate risk reporting and its tone, i.e., whether it is good or bad news and the net tone of 
the risk information. The control factors used for the second hypothesis, in addition to those used for H1, include the book 
to market (BTM) and trading volume. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. Variable definitions, 
measures, and sources are provided in Appendix 2.   
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Table 2. Correlation matrix       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Aggregate risk 
reporting 
1.000                    
(2) Good news about 
risk 0.821a 1.000  
 
  
 
            
 
(3) Bad news about risk  0.816a 0.758a 1.000                  
(4) Net tone of risk  0.004 0.345a -0.349a 1.000                 
(5) Market liquidity -0.269 a -0.380a -0.203a -0.256a 1.000                
(6) Investor-perceived 
risk  -0.170 a -0.211a -0.156a -0.081b 0.268a 1.000 
 
            
 
(7) Risk 0.157a 0.125 a 0.145a -0.027 -0.142a 0.517a 1.000              
(8) Outsider ownership 
0.068c 0.032 0.037 -0.007 -0.063c 0.177a 0.261a 1.000            
 
(9) Employee-held 
shares -0.115a -0.114a -0.137a 0.031 0.135a 0.114a -0.025 0.079 b 1.000           
 
(10) Foreign ownership 
0.056 0.036 0.087b -0.073b 0.063c -0.062c 
 
-0.051 0.060 c -0.108a 1.000          
 
(11) Capital structure 0.291 a 0.269a 0.235a 0.05 -0.188 a -0.101a -0.074b -0.001 -0.029 -0.016 1.000          
(12) External equity 
finance 0.038 0.027 0.047 -0.028 0.135 a 0.115a 0.108a -0.083b 0.004 -0.009 -0.041 1.000        
 
(13) Borrowing 0.035 0.051 0.039 0.017 -0.018 0.021 -0.041 0.196a -0.015 0.024 -0.088b 0.034 1.000        
(14) Dividend payout 0.070c 0.146a 0.045 0.145a -0.334a -0.400a -0.131a -0.026 -0.141a 0.003 -0.034 -0.063a 0.026 1.000       
(15) Liquidity -0.207a -0.199a -0.168 a -0.045 0.227a 0.096a 0.029 -0.610 a -0.023 0.027 -0.009 0.095 a -0.049 -0.047 1.000      
(16) Profitability -0.027 0.072b -0.147 a 0.314a -0.317 a -0.136 a -0.065c 0.026 -0.098a 0.031 -0.063a -0.086b 0.011 0.374a -0.131a 1.000     
(17) Growth -0.064c 0.033 -0.121 a 0.221 -0.067c 0.044 0.057c -0.021 0.028 -0.041 0.024 0.045 -0.023 -0.045 0.017 0.137a 1.000    
(18) Firm size 0.506 a 0.541a 0.462 a .0115a -0.691a -0.396a 0.053 0.499a -0.042 -0.226a 0.023 -0.142a 0.048 0.269 a -0.435a 0.197a -0.026 1.000   
(19) Length of annual 
report 0.738 a 0.685a 0.670 a 0.019 -0.293a -0.166a 0.088a 0.243 a 0.051 -0.088b 0.019 0.030 0.028 0.154a -0.227a 0.048 -0.071b 0.442a 1.000 
 
(20) BTM 0.022 0.057 -0.089 b 0.214a -0.198a 0.084b 0.025 -0.068b 0.007 0.085b -0.013 0.017 -0.041 0.072b -0.063c 0.238a 0.176a -0.029 0.052 1.000 
(21) Trading volume -0.243a -0.164a -0.306 a 0.203a -0.079b 0.304a 0.119 a -0.130a 0.134a 0.063a -0.051 0.053 0.008 -0.149 a 0.143a 0.001 0.106a -0.270a -0.172a 0.036 
This table gives the Pearson correlation coefficients between the continuous variables that are related to H1 (risk reporting incentives). Significant coefficients are presented in bold; a, b, and c indicate 
significance, all for two-tailed t-tests, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided 
in Appendix 2.   
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Table 3. OLS results for the impact of environmental factors on aggregate risk reporting  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ES Aggregate risk reporting (H1)  
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  
Environmental factors:   
Risk  (+) 0.054** 0.191*** 0.176*** 
 (2.043) (5.093) (4.867) 
Outsider ownership (?) 0.019 0.047 0.030 
 (0.773) (1.372) (0.880) 
Employee-held shares (?) -0.002 -0.090** -0.091*** 
 (-0.072) (-2.522) (-2.620) 
Foreign ownership (?) 0.018 0.036 0.036 
  (0.733) (1.047) (1.065) 
Capital structure (?) 0.033 0.189*** 0.255*** 
 (1.055) (4.273) (7.051) 
External equity finance (?) 0.004 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.158) (0.090) (-0.099) 
Borrowing (?) 0.017 -0.019 -0.022 
 (0.728) (-0.543) (-0.612) 
Control factors:     
Dividend payout (?) -0.069** 0.085**  
 (-2.305) (2.167)  
Liquidity (?) 0.039 -0.116 ***  
 (1.270) (-2.676)  
Profitability (?) -0.043 -0.010  
 (-1.391) (-0.236)  
Growth (+) 0.014 -0.026  
 (0.586) (-0.681)  
Firm size (+) 0.264***   
 (6.716)   
Length of annual report (+) 0.593***   
 (15.296)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 61.80% 22.70% 21.60% 
F values 65.21*** 12.28*** 13.40*** 
Observations 715 715 715 
This table answers the question of the extent to which risk information is principally associated with distinctly German features. It examines the 
hypotheses related to H1. The table gives standardized coefficient estimates and the model summary for OLS regressions of 
aggregate risk reporting on environmental factors (Model 3) and all (Model 1) or some (Model 2) other control factors. In this and 
subsequent tables, ES indicates the expected sign (i.e., direction). All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted. t-values are given in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** represent the 10, 5, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided in Appendix 2.   
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Table 4. OLS results for the impact of aggregate risk reporting and its tone on market liquidity and investor-
perceived risk 
 ES Market liquidity (H2a)  Investor-perceived risk (H2b) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Risk-related disclosure         
Aggregate risk reporting (?) -0.010    -0.045   
  (-0.268)    (-1.285)   
Good news about risk (?)  -0.117**    -0.134***  
   (-2.091)    (-2.873)  
Bad news about risk (?)  0.102**    0.109**  
   (2.001)    (2.296)  
Net tone of risk (?)   -0.077**    -0.086*** 
    (-2.184)    (-2.860) 
Control factors          
Outsider ownership (?) -0.038 -0.040 -0.041  0.017 0.018 0.018 
  (-1.329) (-1.387) (-1.387)  (0.616) (0.658) (0.638) 
Employee-held shares (?) -0.031 -0.029 -0.029  0.001 0.005 0.006 
  (-1.160) (-1.073) (-1.073)  (0.031) (0.197) (0.204) 
Foreign ownership (?) 0.047** 0.046** 0.046*  -0.006 -0.014 -0.015 
  (1.988) (1.970) (1.952)  (-0.168) (-0.376) (-0.393) 
Firm size (-) -0.761*** -0.748*** -0.755***  -0.414*** -0.405*** -0.417*** 
  (-17.301) (-17.707) (-18.493)  (-8.087) (-7.837) (-7.599) 
BTM (-) -0.137*** -0.128*** -0.129***  0.086** 0.096*** 0.097*** 
  (-4.280) (-3.868) (-3.874)  (2.365) (2.665) (2.667) 
Capital structure  (-) 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.177***  0.172*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 
  (4.311) (4.388) (4.431)  (5.512) (5.302) (5.312) 
Risk  (-) -0.070* -0.070* -0.071*  0.489*** 0.482*** 0.481*** 
  (-1.785) (-1.810) (-1.823)  (13.779) (13.718) (13.821) 
Trading volume (-) -0.160*** -0.154*** -0.154***  0.117** 0.128*** 0.130*** 
  (-5.390) (-5.078) (-4.995)  (2.566) (2.833) (2.859) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 55.00% 55.40% 55.50%  48.60% 48.60% 48.70% 
F values 46.03*** 45.32*** 47.44***  33.91*** 35.22*** 33.32*** 
Observations 667 667 667  667 667 667 
This table answers the question of whether, and if so to what extent, the observed risk information is useful. It examines the hypotheses 
related to H2. The table gives standardized coefficient estimates and the model summary for OLS regressions of market 
liquidity (Models 1, 2, and 3) and investor-perceived risk (Models 4, 5, and 6) on aggregate, good and bad news, and the net 
tone of risk reporting, respectively. ES indicates the expected sign (i.e., direction). All continuous variables are winsorized at 
1% on both tails. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted; t-values are given in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
represent the 10, 5, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided in 
Appendix 2. 
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Table 5. OLS results for the impact of the financial crisis on aggregate risk reporting and its tone  
 E.S Aggregate risk reporting Good news about risk Bad news about risk  Net tone of risk  
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Environmental factors:      
Risk  (+) 0.047* 0.037 0.007 0.044 
  (1.827) (1.284) (0.257) (1.178) 
Outsider ownership (?) 0.031 -0.011 -0.017 0.009 
  (0.743) (-0.386) (-0.692) (0.245) 
Employee-held shares (?) -0.018 0.026 -0.013 0.058 
  (-0.109) (0.942) (-0.524) (1.593) 
Foreign ownership (?) 0.019 0.022 0.042 -0.027 
  (0.798) (0.861) (1.587) (-0.750) 
Capital structure (?) 0.088 0.041 0.007 0.011 
  (1.004) (0.408) (0.213) (0.239) 
External equity finance (?) 0.005 0.022 0.028 -0.009 
  (0.183) (0.814) (1.075) (-0.275) 
Borrowing (?) 0.020 0.041* 0.016 0.037 
  (0.844) (1.698) (0.650) (1.106) 
Control factors:      
Dividend payout (?) -0.072** -0.028 -0.075** 0.067* 
  (-2.406) (-0.993) (-2.490) (1.669) 
Liquidity (?) 0.041 0.037 0.046 -0.013 
  (1.343) (1.061) (1.395) (-0.274) 
Profitability (?) -0.040 -0.011 -0.127*** 0.166*** 
  (-1.308) (-0.359) (-4.219) (4.075) 
Growth (+) 0.012 0.062** -0.020 0.121*** 
  (0.531) (2.266) (-0.784) (3.259) 
Firm size (+) 0.262*** 0.357*** 0.315*** 0.067 
  (6.681) (8.265) (7.662) (1.348) 
Length of annual report (+) 0.605*** 0.532*** 0.509*** 0.045 
  (16.503) (13.092) (13.113) (1.228) 
During financial crisis (?) 0.074*** -0.007 0.175*** -0.263*** 
  (3.371) (-0.302) (7.146) (-8.015) 
Post financial crisis (?) 0.088*** -0.049 0.212*** -0.377*** 
  (3.007) (-1.598) (7.550) (-9.344) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 61.70% 55.20% 59.20% 26.1% 
F values 70.89*** 57.26*** 78.47*** 12.30*** 
Observations 715 715 715 715 
This table provides standardized coefficient estimates and the model summary for OLS regressions of the impact of the financial crisis 
on aggregate risk reporting and its tone (good and bad news about risk, and net tone of risk). Two dummy variables, during and post the 
crisis, are introduced relative to the period prior to the crisis. “During the crisis” takes a value of 1 if the time period is 2008 and 0 
otherwise. “Post the crisis” takes a value of 1 if the time period is 2009 and 0 otherwise. ES indicates the expected sign (i.e., direction). 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted. t-values are given in 
parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Variable definitions, measures, and 
sources are provided in Appendix 2. 
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Table 6. OLS results for the impact of environmental factors on changes on aggregate risk reporting and their usefulness 
Panel A: Incentives  Panel B: Usefulness  
 E.S Δ Aggregate risk reporting                                    E.S Market liquidity   Investor-perceived risk 
Model (1) Model (1)  Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Environmental factors:   Risk-related disclosure:       
Risk  (+) 0.044** Δ Aggregate risk reporting  (?) -0.013   -0.056   
  (2.043)   (-0.268)    (-1.285)   
Outsider ownership (?) 0.016 Δ Good news about risk (?)  -0.116**    -0.133***  
  (0.773)    (-2.091)    (-2.873)  
Employee-held shares (?) -0.002 Δ Bad news about risk (?)  0.102**    0.109**  
  (-0.072)    (2.001)    (2.296)  
Foreign ownership (?) 0.015 Δ Net tone about risk (?)   -0.078**    -0.087*** 
  (0.733)     (-2.184)    (-2.860) 
Capital structure (?) 0.027 Control factors          
  (1.055) Outsider ownership (?) -0.038 -0.040 -0.041  0.017 0.018 0.018 
External equity finance (?) 0.003   (-1.329) (-1.387) (-1.387)  (0.616) (0.658) (0.638) 
  (0.158) Employee held shares (?) -0.032 -0.029 -0.029  0.001 0.006 0.006 
Borrowing (?) 0.014   (-1.160) (-1.073) (-1.073)  (0.031) (0.197) (0.204) 
  (0.728) Foreign ownership (?) 0.047** 0.047** 0.046*  -0.006 -0.014 -0.015 
Control factors:     (1.988) (1.970) (1.952)  (-0.168) (-0.376) (-0.393) 
Dividend payout (?) -0.056** Firm size (-) -0.762*** -0.749*** -0.755***  -0.415*** -0.405*** -0.417*** 
  (-2.305)   (-17.301) (-17.707) (-18.493)  (-8.087) (-7.837) (-7.599) 
Liquidity (?) 0.032 BTM (-) -0.138*** -0.129*** -0.129***  0.086** 0.096*** 0.097*** 
  (1.270)   (-4.280) (-3.868) (-3.874)  (2.365) (2.665) (2.667) 
Profitability (?) -0.035 Capital structure  (-) 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.177***  0.173*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 
  (-1.391)   (4.311) (4.388) (4.431)  (5.512) (5.302) (5.312) 
Growth (+) 0.012 Risk  (-) -0.071* -0.0718* -0.071*  0.490*** 0.483*** 0.481*** 
  (0.586)   (-1.785) (-1.810) (-1.823)  (13.779) (13.718) (13.821) 
Firm size (+) 0.213*** Trading volume (-) -0.161*** -0.155*** -0.154***  0.118** 0.129*** 0.130*** 
  (6.716)   (-5.390) (-5.078) (-4.995)  (2.566) (2.833) (2.859) 
Length of annual report (+) 0.478***         
  (15.296)         
Year fixed effects Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 75.30% Adj. R-squared 55.00% 55.40% 55.50%  48.60% 48.60% 48.70% 
F values 118.80*** F values 46.03*** 45.32*** 47.44***  33.91*** 32.82*** 33.32*** 
Observations 715 Observations 667 667 667 667 667 667 
This table gives standardized coefficient estimates and the model summary for OLS regressions of the change in aggregate risk reporting on environmental factors (Panel A). It also 
gives standardized coefficient estimates and the model summary for OLS regressions of market liquidity (Models 1-3) and investor-perceived risk (Models 4-6) on changes in aggregate 
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risk reporting (Models 1 and 4), good and bad news (Models 2 and 5), and net tone about risk (Models 3 and 6), respectively. Changes (Δ) in aggregate news, good and bad news about 
risk, and net tone of risk are defined as the differences between a firm’s scores and the median score for other firms in the same industry over the years. Variable definitions, measures, 
and sources are provided in Appendix 2.   
40 
 
Table 7. Regression results for environmental incentives for aggregate risk reporting after controlling for 
endogeneity 
 ES Aggregate risk reporting (retest H1) 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Environmental factors:    
Risk  (+) 0.086* 0.079** 
  (1.683) (1.995) 
Outsider ownership (?) 0.000 0.000 
  (0.104) (0.718) 
Employee-held shares (?) -0.005 0.004 
  (-0.677) (0.630) 
Foreign ownership (?) 0.004 -0.004 
  (0.700) (-0.596) 
Capital structure (?) -0.011 0.025** 
  (-0.614) (2.579) 
External equity finance (?) -0.004 0.018 
  (-0.555) (1.632) 
Borrowing (?) 0.015 0.011 
  (0.814) (0.526) 
Control factors:    
Dividend payout (?) 0.000 -0.001* 
  (0.055) (-1.817) 
Liquidity (?) -0.010 0.047*** 
  (-0.654) (3.001) 
Profitability (?) -0.000 -0.002 
  (-0.175) (-1.539) 
Growth (+) -0.039 0.079 
  (-0.872) (1.138) 
Firm size (+) 0.371*** 0.242*** 
  (2.815) (8.333) 
Length of annual report (+) 0.544*** 0.366*** 
  (11.560) (8.548) 
Intercept (?) -0.394 1.293*** 
  (-0.607) (4.533) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects NA Yes 
Adj. R-squared 52.5% 39.0% 
Observations 715 530 
This table re-examines the question of the extent to which risk information is principally associated with distinctly German features, previously 
provided under Table 3, after control for endogeneity. This table provides the unstandardized coefficient estimates of panel 
regression fixed effects (Model 1), and it also provides unstandardized coefficient estimates for OLS regressions of aggregate 
risk reporting on lagged environmental and control factors (Model 2). ES indicates the expected sign (i.e., direction). All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted and clustered at the 
firm level. t-values are given in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided in Appendix 2.   
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Figure 1. Generated principal variables 
 
Institutional German characteristics 
 
 
 
Environmental factors 
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This figure explains the linkages between German institutional characteristics and the testable environmental factors and their relations to 
aggregate risk reporting. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided in Appendix 2.   
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 Figure 2. Automated content analysis steps  
 
This figure describes the three main steps taken to generate risk reporting (aggregate and tone) scores. 
 
 
 
1. Compile the risk 
word list 
Identify the final risk word list  
 
 
Identify the initial risk word 
list based on three main 
sources  
2. Design the command 
file 
3. QSR version 6 
output 
 
Search all annual reports for any statement indicating risk (i.e., that 
contains at least one word from our final risk word list). 
The accounting literature  
 
Synonyms for the 
previous keywords 
The narrative sections of 
the annual reports 
Eliminate initial risk words 
that did not appear in this 
search 
15 annual reports are text-
searched using QSR version 6 
 
Count the total number of statements 
indicating risk, which gives the aggregate 
risk reporting score for each firm, each year.  
Risk reporting tone 
 
Bad news about 
risk 
Good news about risk Net tone of  risk  
Classify these statements based on tone (based on our list of 
words indicating good (upside), bad (downside), and net 
(difference between upside and downside scores) tone of risk. 
Aggregate risk 
reporting 
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Appendix 1. Sample selection  
All-share non-financial firms listed on Frankfurt market, obtained from Thomson One Banker 716 
Exclude: 
              Firms that provided their annual reports in the German language only 
 
(497) 
               Cross-listed firms  (5) 
              Firms without a December 31 fiscal year-end  (14) 
              Firms with unconvertible (into text) annual reports  (15) 
              Firms that provided their annual reports under the US GAAP in 2005 and/or 2006  (14) 
              Firms without a complete time series of  both annual reports and market data  (28) 
Final sample size (number of  firms) in each year  143 
Firm-year observations (5*143) 715 
This table shows the sample selection procedure 
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Appendix 2. Variable definitions 
Variable Definitions, measures and sources 
Risk-related disclosure:  
All risk information that can be found in the narrative sections of  annual reports. This typically relates to the 
discussion sections that exclude the financial statements but include the notes to the accounts. The scores 
are generated based on textual analysis using QSR version 6 to count the number of statements that contain 
at least one word from our final risk word list. The score is the natural log of the number of statements 
indicating risk in the narrative sections of annual reports. Appendix 3 provides examples of  statements that 
illustrate risk-related disclosure. 
Aggregate risk reporting 
Risk reporting tone: 
Bad news about risk  
 
 
All possible information about risk that reflects bad news in the narrative sections of annual reports. The 
number of statements indicating risk and conveying bad news is calculated based on textual analysis using 
QSR version 6. Bad news is identified based on a specific list of words that reflect the downside of risk. The 
score is the natural log of the number of statements.    
 
Good news about risk  All possible information about risk that reflects good news in the narrative sections of annual reports. The 
number of statements indicating risk and conveying good news is calculated based on textual analysis using 
QSR version 6. Good news is identified based on a specific list of words that reflect the upside of risk. The 
score is the natural log of the number of statements.    
 
Net tone of risk The net effect of good and bad news about risk, measured as the difference between the scores for good and 
bad news about risk, as previously calculated. 
Market indicators:  
Market liquidity  Measured over three months (from May to July) to ensure that the annual report is publicly available, it is the 
mean of the relative spread, which is calculated by dividing the difference between the daily ask and bid prices 
by the average of the daily ask and bid prices. The equation is as follows: 
(𝐵𝑖𝑑 − 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑) =
1
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠
∑
Ask−Bid
(Ask+Bid)/2
Days
d=1   
Required data are obtained from Datastream. 
Investor-perceived risk Measured over three months (from May to July) to ensure that the annual report is publicly available, this is 
the mean of the volatility (standard deviation) of market returns. Required data are obtained from Datastream. 
Environmental factors:        
Risk  Firm risk measured by market beta which captures firm’s systematic risk. Market beta was calculated as the 
covariance of a firm’s market return relative to a market index, based on between 23 and 35 consecutive 
month-end prices of German firms relative to the market returns of the FazAktien index, obtained from 
Datastream. 
 
Outsider ownership 
 
 
Employee-held shares 
 
 
 
Foreign ownership  
 
 
Measured as Free-float NOSH, which is the percentage of total shares in issue and available to ordinary 
investors, obtained from Datastream. 
 
The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held by employees, or by those with a substantial position 
in a company that provides significant voting power at an annual general meeting (typically family members), 
obtained from Datastream. 
 
Measured by Free-float foreign holdings, which is the percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held 
by an institution domiciled in a country other than that of the issuer: N.B. Before March 1st 2005 this data 
type was calculated as a separate strategic component. Since that date, NOSHFR has represented the foreign-
held holdings of 5% or more included in the total strategic holdings. This is obtained from Datastream. 
  
Capital structure 
 
Measured as the natural log of leverage. Leverage is proxied by [Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt & 
Current Portion of Long Term Debt] / [Common Equity] * 100, obtained from Datastream. 
 
External equity finance 
 
Calculated as in Francis et al. (2005) as [1 (CFO/ CAPX)] , where CFO is net cash flows from operating 
activities, and CAPX is capital expenditure. These two items are obtained from Datastream.  
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Borrowing  The ratio of borrowing expenses - including the amount received by the company due to the issuance of 
long-term debt (convertible and non-convertible), the increase in capitalized lease obligations, and the debt 
acquired from acquisitions - to the total sources of funds including the total funds generated by the company 
internally and externally during the fiscal period, obtained from Datastream. 
 
Control factors: 
 
Dividend payout Dividend payout ratio, which is captured as the ratio of dividend per share in the last 12 months to the 
earnings per share over the last 12 months, obtained from Datastream. 
 
Profitability Measured by the return on equity (ROE), calculated by dividing net income before preferred dividends by 
the year-end common equity, obtained from Datastream.  
 
Liquidity Measured by the current ratio, calculated by dividing total current assets by total current liabilities, obtained 
from Datastream. 
 
Growth Measured as the ratio of net sales, [(salest1/salest0)-1], obtained from Datastream. 
 
Firm size Measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, obtained from Datastream. 
 
Annual report length  The natural logarithm of the total number of statements coded for the annual report, captured by QSR 
version 6.  
 
Book to market (BTM) Measured as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity, obtained from Datastream. 
 
Trading volume Measured by dividing the daily trading volume by the number of outstanding shares, obtained from 
Datastream. 
This table provides the definitions, measures, and sources for all variables.  
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Appendix 3. Examples of risk-related disclosure statements 
 
Firm’s code/ 
examples 
Aggregate risk reporting Bad news about risk Good news about risk 
C000007807 
Examples  
 
With the strategic refinement of the company as a lifestyle 
company with a diversified product portfolio and a stronger focus 
on retail business, HUGO BOSS was able to increase Group 
sales by an average of 11% per year between 1997 and 2007. 
General economic conditions differed widely among the major 
traditional industrialized nations in 2007. 
If any of these or other risks or uncertainties occur, or if the 
assumptions underlying any of these statements prove incorrect, 
then actual results may be materially different from those 
expressed or implied by such statements. 
 
 
The Supervisory Board discussed strategic issues 
concerning corporate planning, business policy, 
business development, the risk status and risk 
management, with the Executive Board. 
Explanatory notes on the problems of exchange rates: 
With respect to the import of machine tools, China 
recorded a decline of 13%, however, it still took first 
place for the sixth year in a row with € 4.7 billion 
(previous year: € 5.4 billion). 
Stock can be explained firstly by the low liquidity of the 
common shares compared with the significantly higher 
trading volumes for preferred shares. 
 
 
In the first half of the year, share prices of both blue 
chips and small- and mid-cap companies increased steadily 
thanks to the good economic trend. 
With the strategic refinement of the company as a 
lifestyle company with a diversified product portfolio and 
a stronger focus on retail business, HUGO BOSS was 
able to increase Group sales by an average of 11% per year 
between 1997 and 2007. 
As a result, the HUGO BOSS Group has been able to 
increase its sales by an average of 11% over the past ten 
fiscal years. 
This was largely the result of higher investments in 
directly owned stores, showrooms, and software, as well 
as operating and office. 
C000007953 
Examples 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
We believe that risk and opportunity management is optimized 
when risks, risk-compensating measures and opportunities are 
identified and assessed where they arise, in conjunction with a 
concerted approach to controlling, aggregating and reporting.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Centralized risk management is responsible for the alignment of 
various corporate functions in the risk and opportunity 
management process and coordinates the involvement of the 
executive and Supervisory Boards as necessary likelihood for 
various risk and opportunity categories.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
When we find ongoing and serious instances of non-compliance 
customized risk list for each factory that is monitored.                                                                      
To mitigate system default risk, we believe there is a medium 
likelihood of losing important individual- Group.             
Declined as a result of capital market uncertainty from the 
subprime mortgage crisis.                                                                                                                                                                    
Revenues in North America decreased 3% to 1.275 
billion in 2007 from 1.321 billion in 2006.
We continue to view a strong reduction of business with 
one of our brands' biggest our assessment of product 
quality risk remains unchanged retailers as having a 
medium likelihood of occurrence.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Higher gross and operating margins as well as lower 
Group (particularly Canada) and Europe.
This exercise has allowed us to reduce risk ... enables us 
to reduce negative consequences that result from 
increasing efficiency in manufacturing processes and 
search by simplifying our sourcing structure, and 
focusing on the sales shortfalls that can occur with key 
customers.  
We believe that risk and opportunity management is 
optimized when risks, risk-compensating measures and 
opportunities are identified and assessed where they 
arise, in conjunction with a concerted approach to 
controlling, aggregating and reporting.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
This appendix gives examples of risk-related disclosure (aggregate and tone) statements extracted from the output of QSR version 6. Key risk words are shown in italics. 
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Appendix 4 Comparisons of  and differences in aggregate risk reporting and risk between German firms and matched firms from 
U.K. and Italy. 
Panel A: Comparisons of  aggregate risk reporting and risk between German firms and matched firms from U.K. and Italy 
 
 
 
Panel B: Differences in aggregate risk reporting and risk between German firms and matched firms from U.K. and Italy 
 
 Variables of  interest  German firms  Matched firms from U.K. and Italy Differences 
Aggregate risk reporting 5.555 5.395 3.674*** 
Risk  0.786 1.033 -6.831*** 
N 712 470  
This appendix presents comparisons of, Panel A, and differences in, Panel B, the mean of  aggregate risk reporting and risk (variable of  
interest for H1) between German firms and matched firms from U.K. and Italy. We collected data over the period of  five years (started from 
2005), for non-financial firms in U.K. and Italy.  Definitions, measures, and sources of  aggregate risk reporting and risk are provided in 
Appendix 2.  The sample of  U.K. and Italy consists of  1,890 firm-year observations (1,450 firm-year observations for the U.K. and 440 firm-
year observations for Italy). We matched firms based on the following firms’ characteristics: firm size, length of  annual report, liquidity, and 
profitability. The matched firms constituted 470 firm-year observations from U.K. and Italy. We examined the differences in these characteristics 
after matching and we did not find significant differences on these characteristics. 
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